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THE ROLE OF RIGHTS IN BENEFIT COST
METHODOLOGY: TIE EXAMPLE OF SALMON AND
HYDROELECTRIC DAMS*
Richard 0. Zerbe Jr.t & Linda J. Graham#
Abstract: Benefit cost analysis is a well-established technique for assessing the impacts of
proposed actions. Accurate benefit cost analysis is essential to making informed decisions
through an understanding of the trade-offs involved in alternative actions. This Article
presents a methodology for improving current benefit cost techniques and hence the
usefulness of benefit cost analysis to decisionmakers. The proposed methodology is based on
recognition of the roles of legal rights and psychological expectations in benefit cost analysis.
Proper consideration of these rights and expectations is critical to an accurate determination of
how benefits and costs are measured and whose interests are included in the analysis.
Addressing these issues will provide more accurate and comprehensive information to
decisionmakers. Application of the proposed methodology may significantly affect the
outcome of a benefit cost analysis and hence impact the decisionmaking process.
The decision of March 1999 to order, new protections for nine
threatened salmon' populations in the Pacific Northwest, combined with
those previously established, will likely result in the largest and most
expensive rescue effort in the twenty-six-year history of the Endangered
Species Act.2 Reportedly, significant contributors to Northwest salmon
mortality are the numerous hydroelectric dams on the Columbia and
Snake Rivers.3 Fishery experts were concerned about the effect of dams
* The authors would like to thank Ron Conner, Eric Espenhorst, Daniel Huppert, Jacoba Johnson,
William Rodgers, Mark Plummer, Jack L. Knetsch, Gary Ellis, John Loomis, The Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission, Ed Woodruff, and librarians at the Walla Walla branch of the Army Corps of
Engineers. We alone are responsible for analyses and conclusions.
t Professor of Public Affairs, Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs, University of Washington;
Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
# J.D. expected 2001, University of Washington School of Law; M.P.A expected 2001, Daniel J.
Evans School of Public Affairs, University of Washington.
1. For purposes of this Article, the term "salmon" includes all affected salmonoid species and
steelhed trout.
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Saving a Regionallcon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1999, at A24.
3. See, e.g., Henry B. Lacey, New Hope for Pacific Salmon? Northwest Resource Information
Center v. Northwest Power Planning Council, Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine
Fisheries Service, and the Aftermath ofJudicial Impatience, 3 Hastings West-Northwest. J. Envtl. L.
& Pol'y 19, 21 (1995) (citing Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity
Promise: Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 Envtl. L. 657,
663-64 (1991); National Marine Fisheries Serv., National Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Factors
for Decline: A Supplement to the Notice of Determination for Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook
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on fish as early as 1924. For instance, the 1924 report of the Washington
State Supervisor of Fisheries noted, "The damming of our larger streams,
the ones most frequented by the anadromous fishes, is rapidly becoming
a serious menace to the existence of the latter.",4 In his 1925 report, the
Supervisor of Fisheries further stated that "the decline of the runs has
been constant, and has approached the danger point."5 In 1931, the
following appeared in the biennial report:
Practically all established power and irrigation projects have
already taken a large toll on fish life. No matter how carefully
developed any fish saving device may be[,] ... any dam or
diversion at once changes the natural conditions of any stream and
thus to a greater or lesser extent depletes the fish life contained
therein.
6
Snake and Columbia River salmon runs have continued to decline,
resulting in listings under the Endangered Species Act.7
Current proposals to mitigate the impacts of hydroelectric dams on
Northwest salmon include increasing the quantity and flow of river
water, constructing bypass channels, and breaching dams. Such
mitigation efforts will likely impact hydropower operators, electricity
consumers, commercial navigators, irrigators, water consumers, fishing
interests, recreational and tourism interests, and the general public. As
final decisions are made regarding strategies for salmon protection, it is
important that decisionmakers consider and properly measure all
consequences faced by these interests. Benefit cost analysis will
necessarily be an integral part of the decisionmaking process. The
contribution of benefit cost analysis depends, of course, on the quality of
Under the Endangered Species Act 8 (1991); Northwest Power Planning Council, Compilation of
Information on Salmon and Steelhead Losses in the Columbia River Basin 121-72 (1987)).
4. 32-33 Washington Supervisor of Fisheries Biennial Rep. 11 (1924).
5. 34-35 Washington Supervisor of Fisheries Biennial Rep. 4 (1926).
6. 40-41 Washington Supervisor of Fisheries Biennial Rep. 28 (1932).
7. The following species are listed under the Endangered Species Act as threatened or
endangered: Snake River sockeye, 50 C.F.R. § 222.23 (1998); Snake River spring/summer and fall
chinook, 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(g), (b) (1998); Snake River Basin steelhead, 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(1) (1998);
lower Columbia River steelbead, 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(m) (1998); and upper Columbia River steelhead,
50 C.F.R. § 222.23(a) (1998); lower Columbia River chinook, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308, 14,321 (1998)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(17)); upper Columbia River chinook, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308,
14,324 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 224.101(a)); Columbia River chum, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,508,
14,513 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(13)); and middle Columbia River steelhead,
64 Fed. Reg. 14,517, 14,525 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(15)).
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benefit cost analysis performed. Accurate and comprehensive benefit
cost analysis is essential both to understanding the trade-offs involved
and to making informed decisions.
Benefit cost analysis techniques have evolved over time, prompted by
changes in sentiment, technique, and environmental law. Still, further
evolution and refinement are needed.8 This Article suggests how benefit
cost analysis can be refined by considering benefits and costs in relation
to the legal rights and psychological expectations of parties impacted by
salmon recovery efforts.9 Proper consideration of these factors is
important in determining how benefits and costs are measured and whose
interests are included in the analysis. Thus, the inclusion of these factors
will likely produce a significant effect on the outcome of the analysis and
the decisionmaking process.10
Part I of this Article outlines the history of hydropower development
in the Northwest. Part II discusses the proposed methodology for
applying legal rights and psychological expectations to benefit cost
analysis in more detail. Part HI explores the various interests that may be
impacted by proposed alterations to Northwest hydroelectric projects. It
also describes the relative certainty of the legal rights and psychological
expectations involved and how these factors should be reflected in a
benefit cost analysis. Part IV illustrates how a consideration of legal
rights and psychological expectations would impact benefit cost analyses
currently being conducted. This Article concludes that proper
8. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, The Human Environment of the Mind: Correcting NEPA
Implementation by Treating Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Risk Allocation as
Environmental Values Under NEPA, 46 Hastings L. Rev. 85 (1994). Further refinement of benefit
cost analysis is particularly important for the Army Corps of Engineers, which performs these
analyses for hydroelectric projects. The Corps currently relies on the U.S. Water Resources
Council's Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water and Related Land
Resources Implementation Studies. This document has not been modified since 1983 and is in need
of significant improvement in a number of areas. For example, there are clear errors in the
application of discount rates, and the guidelines fail to consider income distributional effects. Of
particular concern, the guidelines also fail to consider the rights of parties impacted by actions and
how these rights affect the valuation of benefits and costs.
9. A path for further evolution is suggested in Richard 0. Zerbe Jr., Economic Efficiency in Law
and Economics (Edward Elgar ed., forthcoming 2000) and Richard 0. Zerbe Jr., Is Benefit Cost
Analysis Legal? Three Rules for Benefit Cost Analysis, 17 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 419 (1998)
[hereinafter Zerbe, Is Benefit Cost Analysis Legal?]. This Article expands upon one element of the
suggestions made therein.
10. While proposals for dam modification and removal on Northwest rivers resulting from the
listing of salmon under the Endangered Species Act provide the vehicle for our analysis, the basic
technique is relevant to any benefit cost analysis.
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consideration of rights and expectations may significantly impact the
outcomes of benefit cost analyses.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HYDROPOWER
DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHWEST
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provided the original analyses of
Snake and Columbia River hydroelectric projects." These analyses were
simplistic and uncluttered by mention of ecological concerns, free-
flowing river benefits, tribal interests, species preservation or habitat
concerns, consideration of the winners and losers, or uncertainty of
impacts. The primary benefits considered were power generation, flood
control, navigation, and recreation. While the Corps noted that the
fishery interests sought delay of development of the Columbia and Snake
Rivers until the impact of the proposed dams on the fishing industry
could be determined, 2 the primary costs considered were limited to dam
construction and operating expenses. 3
These early benefit cost analyses failed to provide sufficient
justification for the dams 4 even without considering the impacts on fish,
fishermen, tribes, and other interests. The Corps' report to Congress as
part of authorization for dam construction noted:
[T]he direct navigation and irrigation benefits that would accrue to
the general public from the proposed improvements are not
commensurate with its cost, but it is possible that sufficient surplus
power from the dams can be sold within the next 50 years to make
11. See H.R. Doe. No. 75-704 (1945).
12. See id. at 25.
13. Report on Little Goose Lock and Dam concludes typically: "Based on the investigation and
analyses presented in this report, it is concluded that locating Little Goose Lock and Dam... will
most economically develop maximum power here, and will provide satisfactory navigation
conditions." U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Design Memorandum No. 1: Site Selection and Upper
Pool Determination: Little Goose Lock and Dam Lower Snake River Project 3-46 (1961). This is
typical of many analyses. See Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon
Simultaneously: The Biological, Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River
Dams, Lowering John Day Reservoir, and Restoring Natural Riverflows, in Northwest Water Law
and Policy Project 35 (1998) (on file with authors) ("[Tuhe perceived benefits of dams are fully
quantified and often overstated, while the costs are greatly understated or ignored. Traditional cost-
benefit analysis did not calculate true social costs, such as environmental damage ....
Environmental damages were often dismissed as mere externalities, and systematically excluded
from the economic cost-benefit balance sheet because their impacts were dispersed or more difficult
to quantify than benefits.").
14. See H.R. Doc. No. 75-704, at 42.
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the improvement economically sound. It is not safe to assume,
however, that this can be done.... .5
Inclusion and proper measurement of the benefits and costs of all
affected interests would have provided more accurate information and
allowed for a more thorough consideration of the true long-term effects
of the hydroelectric projects. While the results of benefit cost analyses
are only one element of the decisionmaldng criteria, an accurate and
comprehensive analysis has the potential to impact the end result of the
decisionmaking process.
II. THE BENEFIT COST APPROACH
Benefit cost analysis is a well-established policy analysis technique
used by all levels of government. 6 The technique compares the benefits
and costs of alternative actions. The purpose of benefit cost analysis is to
provide useful information to the decisionmaker and not to furnish the
decision itself.17 It is one tool in understanding the trade-offs involved in
the decisionmaking process. The methodology presented in this Article is
intended to improve the usefulness of this tool by considering how legal
rights and psychological expectations should be included in the analysis
and whose benefits and costs matter.
A. The Relationship ofRights to Benefit Cost Analysis: The Legal and
Psychological Nature of Gains and Losses
Benefit cost analysis values benefits and costs in the form of gains and
losses experienced by those impacted by a proposed action. Gains and
losses are determined or experienced as deviations from a status quo
reference point. What people own or feel they own determines the
reference point. In other words, what people own or feel they own is a
psychological state, a matter of psychological ownership or expectation.
A major determinant of psychological ownership is legal rights. Most
people feel psychological ownership of what they legally own. Hence,
legal rights are important to the calculation of benefits and costs. Where
legal rights and psychological perceptions of ownership diverge,
15. Id.
16. See Jonathan Lesser & Richard 0. Zerbe Jr., A Practitioner's Guide to Benefit Cost Analysis,
in Handbook ofPublic Finance 221-68 (Marcel Dekker ed., 1998).
17. See id
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however, psychological perceptions or expectations become important
and should form the reference point from which to measure gains and
losses.'8 Benefit cost analysis will be most valuable when it is built upon
the recognition of these legal rights and psychological expectations, and
how these impact the values used to measure benefits and costs and the
selection of parties to be included in the analysis.
B. Benefit Cost Measurements: Willingness to Pay and Willingness to
Accept
Benefits and costs should be measured by the willingness to pay
(WTP) and the willingness to accept (WTA) payment. 9 The legal rights
and psychological expectations of the parties affected by a proposed
action should be used to select between the willingness to pay or the
willingness to accept measures. The willingness to pay (WTP) reflects
the price that someone who does not have a good or right would be
willing to pay to buy it-the maximum amount of money one would give
to buy a good or service or to avoid harm. Thus, the WTP value
represents benefits in the form of gains, and costs in the form of gains
foregone, to those who do not have a good or right. The willingness to
accept (WTA) reflects the price that someone who has the good or right
would accept to sell it-the minimum amount of money one would
accept to forego a good or right or to bear harm. Thus, the WTA value
represents benefits in the form of losses restored, and costs in the form of
losses, to those who have a good or right. As a result, benefits and costs
are the sum of the appropriate WTP and WTA measures:
Benefits: The sum of the willingness to pay (WTP) for changes that
are seen as gains and of the willingness to accept (WTA) for
changes that are seen as restoration of losses.
Costs: The sum of the willingness to accept (WTA) for changes
that are seen as losses and of the willingness to pay (WTP) for
changes that are seen as foregone gains.20
18. Psychological expectations include the perception of or belief in ownership and the
expectation of maintaining a chosen way of life. See discussion infra Part U.D.
19. See Richard 0. Zerbe Jr. & Dwight Dively, Benefit Cost Analysis in Theory and Practice
(1994). WTP and WTA are exact utility indicators that provide a complete ranking of choices for an
individual.
20. It is important to note that benefits are not measured exclusively by the WTP, nor are costs by
the WTA. Benefits are to be measured by the WTA when they include losses restored, and costs are
Vol. 74:763, 1999
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C. Divergence Between Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept
Until recently, it was thought that characterizing a particular benefit or
cost as willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) made
little difference in the values used in the benefit cost analysis. It is now
recognized that the distinction between WTP and WTA can make a great
difference.21 Researchers have demonstrated repeatedly that WTA
questionnaires, which ask how much one would accept to sell a good or
right, generate values three to nineteen times greater than those elicited
by WTP questionnaires, which ask how much one would give to buy a
good or right.' Thus, recognition of the rights of the affected parties can
greatly impact the outcome of a benefit cost analysis, as the value of
benefits and costs to those with rights will be properly reflected by the
use of the potentially higher value of WTA, not WTP.
There are three factors that affect the extent of the divergence between
the willingness to pay and the willingness to accept values: income
effect, substitution possibilities, and loss aversion.
1. Income Effect
The more valuable the good or right, the greater the difference
between WTP and WTA. This is referred to as the income effect.
Consider the value of a pleasant view from your home. Someone wishes
to erect a building that will block your view. If you were considered to
own the view, WTA would be used as the measure of value in
recognition of your ownership-it is the price at which you are willing to
sell your view. If you were not considered an owner of the view, WTP
would be used to recognize your lack of ownership. It measures your
to be measured by the WTP where they include gains foregone. The difference between benefits and
costs is simply their sign: positive for benefits and negative for costs. Thus, without loss of accuracy,
costs can be counted as negative benefits and vice versa.
21. This has been demonstrated and noted in what is now a voluminous literature. See, e.g., Jack
L. Knetsch, Asymmetric Valuation of Gains and Losses and Preference Order Assumptions, 33
Econ. Inquiry 134 (1995); Jack L. Knetsch, Environmental Valuation: Some Problems of Wrong
Questions and Misleading Answers, 3 Envtl. Values 351 (1994); Daniel Levy & David Friedman,
The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of
Natural Resources, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 493 (1994); Murray B. Rutherford et al., Assessing
EnvironmentalLosses: Judgments of Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 51
(1998).
22. See Levy & Friedman, supra note 21, at 506; see also Donald Coursey & R.D. Roberts,
Aggregation and the Contingent Valuation Method for Evaluating Environmental Amenities (1992)
(stating that differences for environmental goods may be as much as 142 to 1).
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willingness to buy the same view, for example, by paying the builder to
erect a smaller building. The difference between WTA and WTP, as the
consequence of owning or not owning a good, will be small in the case
of an object of little worth. In the case of a poor view, ownership is
inconsequential because the view has little value and its ownership does
not much change your wealth. Thus, recognition of ownership in a
benefit cost analysis through the use of WTA would have little effect on
the outcome of the analysis. A great view, on the other hand, would be a
different matter. The use of WTA would result in a much higher value
than the use of WTP. Thus, proper recognition of your ownership of a
great view will significantly impact the outcome of a benefit cost
analysis.
2. Substitution Possibilities
Recently, it was shown that the poorer the substitutes for a good, the
greater the divergence between WTP and WPA.23 Put another way, the
more unique the good, the greater the divergence will be between WTP
and WTA. In general, the divergence between WTA and WTP can take
any positive value for normal goods.24 This concept is particularly
important for environmental goods such as unique salmon runs, a unique
grove of trees, and the Grand Canyon, because these goods have poor
substitutes.
3. Loss Aversion
The essence of loss aversion-that individuals value losses more
highly than they value gains-is well supported by empirical studies.
Individuals appear to place a significantly higher value on the units of a
good they already have than on getting additional units of the same good.
Thus, higher values will result where losses of ownership or rights are
properly valued using the WTA, as compared to gains valued using the WTP.
23. See W. Michael Hanneman, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can
They Differ?, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 635 (1991).
24. Normal goods are those that become more desirable when income increases.
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D. The Application ofLegal Rights and Psychological Expectations to
Determine the Reference Point
As discussed above, benefits and costs are measured as gains or losses
from a reference point established by legal rights and psychological
expectations.' Because psychological expectations are often based on
having a legal right, the legal right in most cases establishes the reference
point. The value of a good to one with a legal right is measured using the
willingness to accept (WTA) while the value to one without a legal right
is measured using the willingness to pay (WTP). Where legal rights and
psychological expectations differ, the psychological expectations should
generally be used to define the reference point and hence the use of
WTA or WTP.
26
1. Where Legal Rights Are Clear and Correspond with Psychological
Expectations
Where legal ownership or rights are clear, well recognized, and not
contrary to well-ingrained social norms, they will generally correspond
with accepted psychological concepts of ownership or expectation. When
this is the case, legal ownership or right establishes a reference point
from which losses and gains are measured. The value of goods or rights
to owners is to be measured by the willingness to accept (WTA),
including the value of previous losses restored. The value to nonowners
is to be measured by the willingness to pay (WTP), including the value
of gains foregone. For most cases, the legal rights will determine whether
WTP or WTA will be used.
2. Where Legal Rights Are Uncertain or Diverge from Psychological
Expectations
Where legal rights are not clear or diverge dramatically from the
psychological precept of ownership, psychological expectations should
be considered. This methodology recognizes the validity of psycho-
logical ownership or expectation in measuring gains and losses.
25. See discussion supra Part H.A.
26. See Zerbe, Is Benefit Cost Analysis Legal? and Zerbe, Economic Efficiency in Law and
Economics, supra note 9, for an elaboration of the reasons why psychological expectations should be
recognized.
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A typical case would be one in which the legal rights are uncertain
and each party has some incomplete psychological expectation of
ownership. In this situation, the benefit cost allocation should be made
based not only on the willingness to pay (WTP) but also on the
willingness to accept (WTA) to the extent that each party has a
subjective sense of psychological ownership. This is equivalent to
examining not only WTP but also the divergence between WTP and
WTA.27 This result is interesting because it signifies that both the sense
of psychological ownership and the divergence between WTA and WTP
are relevant to the decision concerning who should receive the
entitlement. While it may be difficult to represent accurately the sense of
ownership or expectation, it is important for decisionmakers to
understand its significance. Consider, for example, the question of
whether or not the dams on the Elwha River should be removed. There is
general uncertainty regarding a legal public right, but perhaps a strong
psychological sense of entitlement to a free-flowing Elwha. The
divergence between WTP and WTA should, therefore, be weighted by
this sense of public entitlement (WTA), acknowledging the extent to
which restoration of the Elwha is viewed as restoration of a previous loss
rather than as a gain. This weight will include the effect of the
substitution and income effects.28
Consider also the Headwaters Grove in Northern California, the last
major privately owned stand of ancient redwoods. Environmental groups
have thwarted efforts to log the old-growth forests through a series of
lawsuits.29  In this example, the timber company, unlike the
environmental groups, has a recognized legal ownership right.
Furthermore, Headwaters Grove is of purely commercial value to the
timber company and is measured by WTP. The WTP of the
environmental groups is less than the WTP of the timber company, as
evidenced by the environmental groups' inability to purchase the forest
or pay the timber company to prevent logging. However, under the
27. Let P. and Pb represent the subjective sense of psychological ownership by A and B
respectively. Gains are represented by the WTP weighted by the extent to which the party does not
have psychological ownership. Losses are measured using the WTA weighted by the extent to which
a party does have psychological ownership. The good or right goes to A when the net benefit of
having a good is greater to A than to B. The equation can be expressed as WTPa + Pa(WTAa - WTPa)
> WTPb + Pb(WTAb - WTPb), which considers both the WTP and the divergence between the WTA
and the WTP.
28. See discussion supra Part II.C.
29. See Environmental Protection Info. Ctr., Inc., A Headwaters Forest Chronology (on file with
authors).
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proposed methodology, which recognizes psychological expectations, the
inclusion of WTA will better measure the psychological effect of losing
the redwoods on the environmental groups. The resulting value, which
incorporates the environmental groups' psychological expectation, is
presumably much higher than the WTP of the timber company, due in
part to the unique quality of the grove (the substitution effect). In fact,
the environmentalists' ability to delay the cutting of this timber appears
to suggest that courts have recognized their psychological expectation
and have given weight to the willingness to accept (WTA) valuation.0
Providing some role for psychological expectations in benefit cost
analysis is not entirely original. In some circumstances, the law has also
recognized psychological expectations, noting at times the discrepancy
between measures of legal and psychological values and wondering
whether these values are gains or losses.31 In these instances, the law has
evolved to recognize a psychological basis of valuation.32
30. In addition, environmental groups succeeded in compelling the timber company to abandon
certain logging rights or claims to rights in exchange for money and other rights, thereby furthering
the recognition of the public's psychological ownership. However, some regarded this bargain as a
demonstration of inept negotiating by government officials. The contention is that not only was too
much money paid but that too many development rights were given to the timber company so that
coho salmon in the South Fork of the Elk River, which is surrounded by Headwaters, may be
imperiled. See Alexander Cockburn, The Headwaters Deal: Less Than Meets the Eye, Seattle Times,
Mar. 4, 1999;- Environmental Protection Info. Ctr., Inc., EPIC Update and Alert (1999); The U.S.
Assailed on Redwood Appraisal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1998, at A26.
31. See*Levy & Friedman, supra note 21, at 514.
32. Consider The value calculated for the restoration of environmental health following an
environmental harm recognizes a form of psychological expectation on the part of the public-that
is, the price the public is willing to accept (WTA) in exchange for environmental health. This is
different from a market measure of damages calculated by the diminution in value of the
environment, which tends to be based on a lack of ownership-that is, the price the public is willing
to pay (WTP) to protect environmental health. The law has recognized the cost of restoration as an
appropriate measure of damage if the cost of restoration is reasonable in comparison to the
diminution in the value of the land. Since restoration costs that are greater by 50% or more than the
market diminution of value may be recognized as reasonable, restoration custs and psychological
expectations clearly have been afforded special status. See Heninger v. Dunn, 101 Cal. App. 3d 858
(1980); Newsome v. Billips, 671 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Trinity Church v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins., 502 N.E.2d 532 (Mass. 1987). Recently, a number of environmental statutes have
been interpreted by the courts and regulatory agencies as stating a preference for evaluating
environmental damages in terms of restoration costs (WTA) over diminution of economic value
(WTP). See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Moreover, in response to such judicial decisions, both the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) adopted new regulations giving
greater recognition to restoration costs. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (1998).
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3. Valuation of Commercial Goods
Commercial goods are those goods that are not valued for themselves;
rather, they are valued for the monetary income they provide.
Commercial goods present a special case in the valuation of benefits and
costs. The issue of rights is unimportant for economic evaluation of
commercial goods in a benefit cost analysis because the commercial
value of an asset is represented by the present value of the income that
the good provides, which is the equivalent of the market price of the
asset.33 This dollar value is properly represented by the willingness to
pay (WTP).
E. The Relationship of Rights to Economic Standing:34 Determining
Whose Interests to Include in a Benefit Cost Analysis
Every benefit cost analysis involves two issues: (1) the value of the
action being contemplated-in the current case, whether or not to modify
the operations of or to breach hydroelectric dams; and (2) whose values
are to count in addressing the first question. Economic standing refers to
those interests who are counted in a benefit cost analysis.35 Whether a
party has economic standing is part of the fundamental question of the
pattern of rights that are assumed extant in performing a benefit cost
analysis. Under the proposed methodology, legal rights are one
determinant of whose values count, that is, who has economic standing.
Where law and public policy are unclear regarding which party is
assigned a legal right or where the assignment differs substantially from
generally accepted psychological expectations, the proposed
methodology dictates that psychological expectations be considered.
33. The present value of a stream of earnings is the investment required to produce the stream of
earnings at a specified interest rate. For an investment with an infinite time horizon and constant
earnings, the present value formula is simply Air, where A is the periodic earnings and r is the period
interest or discount rate. Consider The value of a machine that produces $100 per year forever has a
present value of $1000 at a 10% discount (interest) rate. This should be the value to one who is
either buying or selling. There is no divergence between the WTP and the WTA. Where one person
can use the machine more effectively than another can, or if the discount rate for one person is less
than for another, the machine would have greater value to that person and thus the person with the
higher value would "win" the good in an auction.
34. Questions of standing are considered extensively in Richard 0. Zerbe Jr., Comment: Does
Benefit Cost Analysis Stand Alone? Rights and Standing, 10 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 96 (1991)
and Zerbe, Is Benefit Cost Analysis Legal?, supra note 9, at 419.
35. See Dale Whittington & Duncan MacRae Jr., The Issue of Standing in Cost Benefit Analysis, 5
J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 665 (1986).
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Those interests with psychological expectations must necessarily be
counted, that is, they must be granted economic standing, as these can
significantly impact the outcome of the analysis.
F. Summary ofProposed Methodology
The following chart summarizes the proposed methodology for
incorporating rights into benefit cost analyses.
RIGHTS SOLUTION
Rights are certain. Party A Use the WTA for party A and the
is the owner, party B is not WTP for party B.
the owner.
No Divergence Rights are certain. Neither Auction: Use WTP for Both
Between Legal party is the owner. Parties.
and Psychological Rights are uncertain. Both Use both WTP and WTA for both
Ownership parties claim ownership. parties weighted by the extent of
psychological expectations or
provide alternative calculations
using WTP and WTA.
Divergence Rights are as in categories Solutions as above except weight is
Between Legal above, given to psychological
and Psychological expectations (WTA).
Ownership
Commercial Property is valued as a Use market value, typicallyGoods commercial resource, referred to by WTP, for all parties.
regardless of rights.
ECONOMIC STANDING
Count values for all interests not excluded by law or custom.
Where the law is unclear, provide alternative calculations.
I. DEFINING RIGHTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON BENEFIT COST
ANALYSIS: THE EXAMPLE OF SALMON AND
HYDROELECTRIC DAMS
This section explores the legal rights and psychological expectations
of those interests impacted and considered to have economic standing in
salmon recovery efforts related to the dams on the Columbia and Snake
Rivers.36 Proposals to mitigate the impact of dams on salmon have
36. The authors have sought to include all of the major interests affected, whether legal or
psychological, in their discussion of the proposals to alter Columbia and Snake River dams, but
recognize that not every interest may be included in this discussion.
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ranged from altering the quantity and flow of river water to constructing
bypass channels to breaching dams. These measures would affect
hydropower operators, electricity consumers, commercial navigators,
irrigators, water consumers, fishing interests (commercial, tribal, and
sport), recreational and tourism interests, and the general public. The
nature of the legal rights and psychological expectations of these
interests is assessed through an interpretation of case law, relevant
statutes (principally the Endangered Species Act, the Federal Power Act,
and the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act
(Northwest Power Act)), and a discussion of the psychological
expectations of the affected interests. The proposed methodology is then
applied to demonstrate the impact that these rights and expectations have
on the measurement of benefits and costs.
A. Hydropower Licensees
Salmon recovery proposals related to hydroelectric dams would
impact the rights of hydropower licensees. Requiring seasonal changes in
river flow, reservoir drawdowns, construction of bypass channels, and
the partial breaching of dam structures would reduce the capacity of a
hydroelectric project to produce power.37 Proposals for decommissioning
would go further, resulting in the loss of a franchise to produce
hydroelectricity.
The property interests and rights of nonfederal hydropower licensees
are controlled, in part, by the Federal Power Act.38 The Act empowers
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate
nonfederal hydroelectric projects through the issuance of licenses, and
the Act establishes federal control over the operation of hydroelectric
projects.39 An existing license is in essence a contract between the
licensee and the federal government, making the contract a property right
to the licensee.4" But once the license expires, the contract ends and the
property right is terminated. The licensee may seek to extend its contract
37. The amount of energy a hydroelectric facility produces is dependent on the elevation of the
reservoir. Several of the proposed scenarios result in changes to reservoir elevations, thereby
affecting maximum energy production. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Analysis of the
Bonneville Power Administration's Potential Future Costs and Revenues 33 n.5 (1998).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1994).
39. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823.
40. See Katharine Costenbader, Comment, Damning Dams: Bearing the Cost of Restoring
America's Rivers, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 635, 657 (1998).
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with the government under relicensing proceedings, but the government
is under no obligation to renew a contractual relationship with the
licensee.41 Under this analysis, the legal rights of the hydropower
licensee are limited to the duration of the contract. United States
Supreme Court decisions support the conclusion that licensees do not
have a vested property interest in an expired license, the value of the
waterpower, the franchise to produce electricity, or the hydropower
development site.42
The rights of hydropower operators are further limited by the authority
of the federal government to control the operations of licensees. Under
the Federal Power Act and subsequent amendments, FERC is obligated
to give development and nondevelopment values equal consideration in
deciding whether to issue a license.43 New and renewal licenses are to be
granted only if the proposed project is found to protect and enhance fish
and wildlife, and satisfies other criteria.' Through the licensing process,
FERC has the authority to impose conditions on the operation of
hydroelectric projects to address these environmental and other criteria.4'
The rights of current license holders are also limited by the potential for
the license contracts to be reopened and new conditions imposed."
FERC, with apparent congressional approval, has also announced that it
possesses the authority to order dam decommissioning at relicensing.47
41. Seeid.
42. See United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960); United States v. Willow
River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229
U.S. 53 (1913). In addition, these cases demonstrate that compensation for lost water power or lost
franchise to produce hydroelectricity is not required under the Fifth Amendment. Nonfederal
hydropower owners do acquire property rights associated with the project lands. However, the
proposed scenarios for protecting salmon generally will not impact private property. Even a
decommissioning order, which extinguishes the value of the property as a hydropower site, does not
destroy all rights of the property. By decommissioning, FERC is ordering licensees to stop producing
hydropower with existing dams. See Costenbader, supra note 40, at 657.
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
44. See 16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
45. See 16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
46. Some licenses include specific re-opener clauses. FERC has also adopted a policy to use
reserved authority in licenses to ameliorate cumulative impacts of projects in the same river basin
through a relicensing process. However, FERC appears reluctant to use these devices and the EPA
seems to suggest that licenses can be altered only upon mutual agreement. See State of Washington,
Draft Statewide Salmon Recovery Strategy 10 (1998) (unpublished).
47. See Costenbader, supra note 40, at 652 ("If State or Federal fish and wildlife agencies report
that a project's impacts... cannot be mitigated, FERC may have to conclude that issuance of the
license, whether original or otherwise, may be inappropriate."); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 339 (1995)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 2.24 (1997)); H.R. Rep. No. 99-597, at 32 (1986).
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The provisions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) also apply to the
operation of federal dams and federal licensing of privately owned dams
insofar as they affect listed species. 48 Therefore, it will likely have a
significant impact on the legal rights and psychological expectations of
dam licensees. Federal agencies that have control over hydroelectric
projects, such as the Bonneville Power Administration, the Army Corps
of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation, are required to insure that
any action they authorize will not likely jeopardize any endangered
species.49 The application of the ESA to hydroelectric projects is
supported by judicial opinions that have upheld conditions placed on the
operation of dams, including the requirement that water be released from
dams to protect the habitat of endangered species.5" One court has also
mandated action after finding that agency failure to challenge status quo
operations violated the ESA.5 Thus, while it is currently unclear what
changes in operations the ESA may require, it is evident that changes to
hydroelectric projects are likely to be mandated under the authority of
the ESA.
The Northwest Power Act establishes the interstate Pacific Northwest
Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council to develop a twenty-
year plan, which has the potential to impact the rights of hydropower
operators. This plan is required to balance the protection and
enhancement of fish and wildlife with an "adequate, efficient,
economical, and reliable power supply," essentially placing fish and
wildlife concerns on "equal footing" with hydroelectric power
generation.52 The Council theoretically possesses the ability to reject
48. See Lacey, supra note 3, at 47.
49. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
50. See Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1985).
51. See Lacey, supra note 3, at 47-48; see also Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine
Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994). In its 1993 biological opinion, NMFS noted several
impacts dams have on salmon and concluded that the Columbia River dams pose the largest single
human-induced cause of salmon mortality. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., 1993 Draft
Biological Opinion on the Operations of the Federal Columbia River Power System (1993). Despite
this, NMFS issued a "no jeopardy" opinion. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game challenged
this finding. In 1995, NMFS responded by issuing a revised biological opinion which concluded that
status quo operations of the hydroelectric system would jeopardize the listed stocks. See National
Marine Fisheries Serv., Endangered Species Act Section 7 Biological Opinion on the Reinitiation of
Consultation and 1994-98 Operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System and Juvenile
Transportation Program (1995).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 839(1)(A), (1)(B), (2) (1994). See also National Wildlife Fed'n v. FERC, 801
F.2d 1505, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 1986); Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 746 F.2d 466,473 (9th Cir. 1984).
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biologically beneficial measures on the basis of "economic"
considerations.53 However, the federal courts have ruled that the Council
may not reject recommended measures simply because they reduce
power production and impose economic costs on the region.' Thus, in
order to comply with the equal footing principle, the Council may
recommend changes in the operation of federal and' nonfederal
hydroelectric projects to balance power production with fish and wildlife
protection.
No matter what measures are taken to protect salmon, hydroelectric
operators will likely experience a loss. The correct measure of value for
this loss to hydropower licensees is nevertheless the willingness to pay
(WTP). There is two-fold support for this conclusion. First, and
definitively, the value of a hydroelectric project is in its commercial
value. Thus, the WTP measure is used, as this will not differ from the
willingness to accept (WTA).55 Second, this conclusion is supported as a
matter of legal rights. The legal rights of licensees are clearly limited,
thus requiring the use of WTP.5" Hydropower licensees may argue a
psychological expectation of a reasonable return on their investment
particularly in light of FERC imposed requirements. Acceptance of this
argument would warrant the use of WTA as the measure of loss. This
psychological expectation, however, is not enough to overcome the
necessity of valuing the loss based on commercial value. The potential
cost to hydropower licensees should therefore be measured using the
willingness to pay (WTP), which reflects the present value of their lost
income.
B. Electricity Consumers
Salmon recovery proposals will also impact the rights of electricity
consumers. Decreases in power generation are likely to cause increases
in electricity rates to commercial and private consumers. In addition, as
53. See Lacey, supra note 3, at 44.
54. See id; see also Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35
F.3d 1371, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994).
55. See discussion supra Part ll.D.3.
56. See discussion supra Part ll.D.
57. See Costenbader, supra note 40, at 656.
58. It is relevant to the discussion of compensation, which is a related issue but is not directly
relevant to our discussion here.
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mitigation conditions are imposed on hydroelectric projects, the cost of
these mitigation actions may be passed on to electricity consumers.
The Northwest Power Planning Council is charged under the
Northwest Power Act with providing an "adequate, efficient,
economical, and reliable power supply."59 This suggests some consumer
rights to and expectations of a certain level of economical power costs.
However, courts have stated that power losses and economic costs
should not preclude restoration of the salmon runs as long as the
Northwest Power Act's baseline condition of an "adequate, efficient,
economical, and reliable power supply" remains in place.6 Based on the
courts' interpretation, the balancing of economic power production with
salmon protection appears to allow for some changes in the current rates
imposed on consumers.
In general, higher electricity prices will be experienced as a loss to
commercial and private consumers. For commercial consumers, the
willingness to pay (WTP) should be used to represent the loss because
the value of the electricity lies solely in its commercial value. For private
consumers, there will likely be some divergence between the willingness
to pay and the willingness to accept as a result of the divergence between
legal rights and psychological expectations. This divergence between the
WTP and WTA for electricity users will depend on how great the
increase is in electricity prices. If the increase in price is large enough to
have a significant effect on income, the income effect will produce a
significant discrepancy.6 In this case, the willingness to accept (WTA)
measure should be used. The WTA should be measured by the additional
income the customers would need to buy the same electricity at the new,
higher prices.62
C. Commercial Navigation
Proposals for reservoir drawdowns and changes in river flow have the
potential to impact the rights of navigation interests because the
navigation locks at one or more dams would become unusable.
Insufficient depth in the river and in the locks would prohibit the locks
59. 16 U.S.C. § 839(1)(A), (1)(B), (2) (1994).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 839(l)(A), (1)(B), (2).
61. See discussion supra Part II.C.
62. This will slightly overvalue the WTA.
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from lifting vessels into navigation pools. Breaching dams also has the
potential to impact navigation as the level and flow of the resulting river
could preclude vessel passage. Thus, commercial navigation interests,
including port facilities and the economy in these areas, face the potential
for the end of commercial navigation on at least portions of the Columbia
and Snake Rivers.
According to legal opinion, the Columbia and Snake River ports, as
well as the tug and barge industry, have congressionally granted legal
rights in the navigability of these river systems.63 The right of slack-
water navigation was granted by Congress, under its Commerce Clause
authority, to a depth of no less than fourteen feet, both in the river
channels and through the navigation locks at each of the dams from
Bonneville Dam to Lower Granite Dam.r6 Any alteration in the
navigability, or slack-water, of the system is unlawful and prohibited
unless Congress specifically authorizes such a change.65 Congress has
not granted specific authority to modify this right. Thus, neither the
Endangered Species Act nor the Northwest Power Act currently confers
any power to bring the navigation channels below the congressionally
mandated fourteen-foot level.'
Despite this interpretation of legal rights, the measurement of the loss
to commercial navigation is a matter of commercial value, thus
willingness to pay (WTP) is the correct measure.67 This measure would
apply for navigators as well as port facilities. To the extent economic
standing is extended to economic impacts on port communities, the
willingness to accept (WTA) should be used to represent the
psychological loss of a way of life.
63. See Memorandum from Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., to Columbia River Tug Ass'n
and Port of Morrow 2-3 (Apr. 29, 1997) (on file with authors).
64. See i& at7 (citing 76 Stat. 1173 (1962)).
65. See id. at 8 (citing United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174 (1934); Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96
U.S. 379 (1877)). Only Congress can modify what it has previously granted, as the separation of
powers prevents the courts and federal agencies from acting unless the power to do so has been
specifically delegated by Congress.
66. See id. at 9-12. Under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, the power of federal agencies
to enforce ESA's mandate for species preservation is limited to their statutory authorities.
Recommendations of the Northwest Power Council plan are only advisory.
67. See discussion supra Part ll.D.3.
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D. Irrigators and Other Water Users
The rights of water users could be affected through changes in
reservoir and river levels resulting from the release of water in order to
maintain instream flows or from breaching of hydroelectric dams. Ample
water levels, particularly in reservoirs, are crucial to ensure an adequate
supply of water for the mid-April through late-September irrigation season
in the Columbia River Basin.68 Requiring changes in reservoir levels or
other alterations to dam operations and structures could result in system
modifications or the unavailability of water as it is diverted from current
users to protect salmon. Impacts will likely include costly irrigation
system modifications or the loss of farmland due to the unavailability of
water, as well as impacts to municipal and industrial water consumers.
The allocation of water is governed by a state law appropriation
system that determines the private rights to the use of water.69 The
system is based on the principle of "first in time, first in right," which
governs the priority in water rights and allows water users to divert water
from streams for beneficial uses.7" A crucial question is the extent to
which these rights can be abrogated by federal statutes and the impact of
this on the assessment of rights.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires federal agencies to
cooperate with state agencies to resolve water resource issues."
According to judicial interpretation, this cooperation does not preclude
the federal government from overriding state water laws to protect a
listed species. The ESA has been applied to uphold conditions placed on
the operation of hydroelectric projects, such as the diversion of water for
the conservation of endangered species at the expense of state water rights.72
68. See Bonneville Power Admin. et al., The Columbia River System: The Inside Story 6-8 (1991);
Joy Ellis, Drafting from an Overdrawn Account: Continuing Water Diversions from the Mainstem
Columbia andSnake Rivers, 26 Envtl. L. 299,303 (1996).
69. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907).
70. See Ellis, supra note 68, at 304.
71. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (1994).
72. See Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985); Carson-Truckee
Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 704 (D. Nev. 1982), aff'd in part and vacated in part
sub nom. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Congress established federal control over the use of waters for
hydropower purposes with the enactment of the Federal Power Act.73
Courts have interpreted this authority to include the ability to impose
conditions when granting hydropower licenses that require maintenance
of minimum stream flows to protect salmon runs, even where state-
created water rights would be affected.74 Water rights could be further
impacted by the Northwest Power Act's mandate that the twenty-year
regional plan include protection and enhancement of salmon.75 This plan
could recommend changes in water levels and water allocation, thereby
affecting water rights.
From a legal perspective, it is clear that water users have a legal right
to use appropriated water. However, the use of willingness to accept
(WTA) is precluded in this case for two reasons. First, statutory authority
for abrogation substantially limits these legal rights. Second, the value of
water to farmers, municipalities, and industry as a productive resource
necessitates the use of willingness to pay (WTP) to represent the loss of
commercial value. Neither the income nor the substitution effect would
operate here.76 In the case of farmers, the loss would be reasonably
measured by the diminished value of their land as a result of no longer
having access to cheaper irrigation water. To the extent that the way of
life for farmers is affected, either because they are no longer able to' get
any water or because equipment modifications are too expensive, the use
of willingness to accept (WTA) is appropriate as a reflection of
psychological expectation.
E. Commercial Fishing
The anticipated benefit of changes to hydroelectric projects is the
restoration of salmon runs resulting in the removal of the species from
the Endangered Species list. As a result, strict limitations on commercial
fishing for salmon are likely to be reduced or eliminated, thereby
increasing the potential of financial benefits to commercial fishermen
and associated businesses.
73. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1994).
74. See Nicholas Targ, Water Law on the Public Lands: Facing a Fork in the River, 12 Nat.
Resources & Env't 14, 18 (1997); see also California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990); California v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965).
75. See 16 U.S.C. § 839(1)(A), (1)(B), (2) (1994).
76. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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It is generally anticipated that in the short run, commercial fishing will
experience a loss due to tighter restrictions on fishing as part of the
efforts to restore salmon. Should salmon stocks increase in the long run,
however, the net result will be a gain. Based on the purely commercial
value of the interest, the willingness to pay (WTP) measure should be
used. This is also correct from a rights perspective, as fishing licenses
and permits are generally considered to confer a privilege, not a right,
which is revocable at the discretion of the issuing agency." The WTP
measure should reflect the net long-term gain in income.
F. Tribal Fishing
Salmon play a central role in Northwest tribal activity, culture, and
ceremony. They provide a source of food, commercial income, and a
way of life. Thus, to the extent that changes to the operations of
hydroelectric projects are successful in restoring the salmon, tribal
interests will benefit.
Treaties between the Northwest tribes and the U.S. government
contain provisions acknowledging the right of tribal members to "take
fish in common with all citizens of the territory at all usual and
accustomed places."78 The tribal rights secured in such treaties have been
defined in a long line of judicial decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has
concluded that treaties are a reservation of rights and that this reservation
of rights created, in essence, a property right.79 Lower courts have further
interpreted the extent of this property right as "fair share"8 and as fifty
percent of the catch.8' The Supreme Court has affirmed these definitions"
and has also stated that tribal fishermen are immune from all federal and
77. See Joseph J. Kalo et al., Coastal and Ocean Law (photo. reprint of draft Sept. 1998) (3d ed.
1998).
78. Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat
Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 407, 409
(1998) (citing Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, U.S.-Nisquallys-Puyallups, art. 3, 10 Stat.
1132, 1133; Treaty with the Nez Perces, June 11, 1855, U.S.-Nez Perces, art. 3, 12 Stat. 957, 958).
79. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905) (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S.
1 (1899); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886)).
80. See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (D. Or. 1969).
81. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
82. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 686, modified sub noma. Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816 (1979) (stating that Indian
treaty right "secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a
livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living").
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state regulation of fishing locations and catch limits except that required
for conservation.83
Courts have also inferred that these treaties include protection for
salmon habitat, stating that the tribes are entitled to more than the mere
chance to dip their nets into empty waters.' One Washington district
court reasoned that the treaties implied a right of protection for fish
habitat necessary for the survival of the fish that were the primary
purpose of the treaty." While the fulfillment of this right to habitat
protection has been controversial both in practice and in the courts, 6
lower courts have provided the tribes with relief. The treaty right has
been interpreted to entitle tribes (1) to ask for changes in dam operations
to maintain streamfiows essential for fish habitat and migration,87 (2) to
enjoin dam construction,8 and (3) to modify plans of the Federal
Columbia River Power System for peaking power purposes.89 In sum,
these cases demonstrate that tribal treaty rights include the power to
change dam operations to preserve salmon habitat.90
The authority of Congress to abrogate treaty rights has been
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.9' However, the Court has ruled
that federal statutes do not abrogate treaty rights unless there is "clear
evidence" that Congress actually considered the conflict and specifically
83. See Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 658; Puyallup
Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
84. See United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
85. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 78, at 415; see also United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp.
at 203-04.
86. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 78, at 415; see also United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d
1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane). Upon appeal, an en bane panel of the Ninth Circuit noted that
the legal standards governing the state's habitat protection duties under the treaty "will depend for
their definition and articulation upon concrete facts which underlie a dispute in a particular case."
The panel thus failed to reach a conclusion on the habitat issue.
87. See Michael C. Blumm, Fulfilling the Parity Promise: A Perspective on Scientific Proof
Economic Cost, and Indian Treaty Rights in the Approval of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, 13 Envtl. L. 103, 141 (1982).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 78, at 467.
91. Because Congress exercises "plenary power" over Indian affairs, it has the power to
unilaterally void or abrogate treaty rights. See Robert J. Miller, Speaking with Forked Tongues:
Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the Endangered Species Act, 70 Or. L. Rev. 543, 563-64 (1991); see
also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565
(1903).
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chose to abrogate the treaty.92 The ESA is silent in regards to treaties.93
However, the protection of treaty fishing rights has been addressed in a
1997 order issued by the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce on
tribal rights, federal trust responsibilities, and the ESA.' United States
Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service
provide further guidance.9 5 These reports detail a set of principles which
acknowledge tribal rights and define the government's trust obligation to
protect treaty fishing rights.96
A determination of the nature of tribal rights and their associated
value involves two distinct measurements. The above analysis presents a
strong argument that restoration of the rivers and larger salmon runs is a
restoration of a loss for tribes. Interpretations of treaties as a reservation
of legal rights suggest the use of willingness to accept (WTA) to
represent the restoration of a loss. In addition, tribes appear to view the
restoration of the rivers and salmon as not just a restoration of a treaty
right, but a restoration of a right they are entitled to as a part of the earth
and creation.' Thus, the WTA measurement recognizes not only the
legal right but also the importance of this psychological expectation and
the restoration of a way of life. The commercial value of the salmon to
the tribes would be measured separately, using willingness to pay (WTP).
92. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,740 (1986).
93. See Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Native
Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration "s Promises and
Performance, 25 Envtl. L. 733, 790 n.274 (1995).
94. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 78, at 495.
95. See Wood, supra note 93, at 792 (citing National Marine Fisheries Serv., Proposed Recovery
Plan for Snake River Salmon (1995); Memorandum from the Director of U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.
to the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs (Aug. 24, 1994)).
96. The principles would allow the government to impose restrictions on tribal activities only
when: (1) the restrictions imposed on treaty fishing are "reasonable and necessary" for the
conservation of the species; (2) the restrictions are the least restrictive alternative to achieve the
benefits of development; (3) the restrictions do not discriminate in any way against treaty fishing;
and (4) voluntary tribal conservation measures are not adequate to achieve the conservation purpose.
See Blumm & Swift, supra note 78, at 495. There is disagreement regarding a fifth principle: the
extent to which non-Indian activities must be restricted before regulation may be directed at Indian
activities. See Wood, supra note 93, at 793. Blumm and Swift believe that developments should
provide tribes with "just compensation" for the loss or diminishment of treaty rights if the proposed
developments produce a significant loss of treaty fishing and impair the tribes' moderate living
needs, despite efforts to satisfy these principles. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 78, at 497.
97. Telephone conversation with Randy Settler, Yakima Division of the Inter-Tribal Fish
Comm'n (Mar. 30, 1999).
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G. Sport Fishing
Sports fishermen, as well as associated businesses, would benefit from
increased salmon runs, as limitations imposed on sport fishing are likely
to be reduced or lifted. The sport fishermen are likely to experience a
restoration or increase in a valued and unique way of life, while
supporting businesses may realize financial benefits.
As with commercial fishing, sports fishermen and associated busi-
nesses are likely to experience an initial loss due to restrictions on
fishing, followed by a long-term gain as the numbers of fish increase. For
the supporting businesses to which sport fishing has a commercial value,
the correct measure would be willingness to pay (WTP). This should
reflect the net long-term gain. To the extent that sport fishing is a way of
life that is highly valued and fairly unique, the measure should recognize
a sense of psychological expectation. Both the income effect and
substitution possibilities will result in large discrepancies between the
WTA and the WTP.9" In this case, the use of willingness to accept
(WTA) is the appropriate measure.
H. Recreation and Tourism
The results of proposed changes in dam operations increase some
recreational opportunities and diminish others. Activities related to rivers
and riparian habitats include boating, fishing, and picnicking. Operators
of existing recreational facilities and related businesses will likely feel
the changes as an economic loss; however, opportunities for new
recreational businesses will be valued as a gain. Due to the commercial
value associated with recreational and tourism businesses, the correct
measure is the willingness to pay (WTP). The value experienced by
recreational users of the natural environment is not generally accounted
for by economic or market values. Despite the challenge of estimating
these values, they are an important element in assessing project benefits
and costs." Existing recreational users who would lose opportunities
would experience a loss that should be valued by the willingness to
accept (WTA), which recognizes the importance of their psychological
expectation and their loss. Some recreation users will experience gains
98. See discussion supra Part ILC.
99. See Daniel D. Huppert et aL, River Economics: Evaluating Trade-Offs in the Columbia River
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program (manuscript at 24, on file with authors).
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from new opportunities which should be valued using the WTA that
recognizes a psychological expectation and the restoration of a previous
loss. Gains experienced by those who simply value a free-flowing river
or wild salmon are addressed in the following section.
I. Existence Value to the Public
In addressing the public as an affected party, we are referring to their
"existence values," often called "non-use values" or "passive use
values". These concepts represent the value people place on the very
existence of a good.' 0 Existence values are difficult to measure because
they are not reflected by market values. Despite the difficulty of deter-
mining these nonmarket values, the values can be large, particularly for
environmental goods, and may be crucial to rational preservation
decisions.'0 '
Three crucial questions arise when using existence values. First, what
goods represent existence values that are to be included in a benefit cost
analysis? That is, which goods are to be given economic standing?
Usually, existence values are calculated only for such goods as species or
habitat preservation. Many goods, however, have some existence value.
In analyses of proposals to protect salmon, some studies do not consider
existence values, others consider the existence value of salmon, while
others consider both salmon and free-flowing rivers. No rationale is
articulated for these choices. The rule should be to count all goods for
which existence value is likely to be important.
Second, what are the groups of people for whom existence value
should be counted? Analyses reflect differing assessments of the affected
population. For example, in the case of the Nestucca oil spill, the
populations of Washington and British Columbia were used for
estimating damages, while in the case of the Exxon Valdez spill, the
population of the entire United States was held to be the potentially
affected population.'
100. Typically, we do not speak in terms of rights of natural resources themselves. Natural
resource rights are reflected through statutory protections such as the ESA that impose legal duties
enforceable by others. In benefit cost analysis, a resource's right is reflected in both the use and non-
use values we place on it. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How
Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
101. See Huppert et al., supra note 99, at 27.
102. See Richard W. Dunford et al., Whose Losses Count in Natural Resources Damages?, 15
Contemp. Econ. Pol'y 77, 80 (1997).
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Related to this second question is the issue of whether or not existence
values should be counted when the harm is not known. The argument has
been made that without specific knowledge of the injury there can be no
loss. 3 This argument fails, however, since it ignores the relation of
wealth to value. People who care about salmon runs and free-flowing
rivers care about environmental wealth. They care about the Elwha River
salmon and the like as belonging to a class of goods that constitute this
wealth. Those who put a non-use value on species preservation may not
know about a particular species, but may be reasonably said to care about
it as part of a genera or class of species they do care about. Thus,
existence value should be counted regardless of whether the harm is
known.
A thorough discussion of how to resolve these two issues is beyond
the scope of this Article. In short, the determination of what goods
represent existence values and what groups of people for whom existence
value should be counted will involve consideration of the concepts of
legal and economic standing. In addition, the proposed rights-based
approach requires recognition of psychological expectations in making
these determinations.
The third question, which is most relevant to the proposed
methodology, is how to determine the correct measurement of existence
values-willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA).
Surveys framed from a WTA perspective, asking how much one would
be willing to accept to sell his or her right, tend to elicit much higher
values than WTP questions, asking how much one would pay to obtain
the right or protection.! The phrasing of the question reflecting
ownership or a lack thereof can thus greatly impact the measurement of
existence value. Resolution of these issues will depend in part on the
definition of ownership of natural resources. Consider: If the public owns
the right to clean air, then the use of WTA is appropriate. If polluters
have the right to degrade the air, such as through pollution permits, then
the use of WTP for the public reflects the lack of a public right. 5 The
common law, statutes, and economic analyses have been inconsistent in
regards to the legal rights associated with existence value but appear to
be tending toward recognition of public ownership rights, both legal and
103. See id. at 81 ("[A] ... criteria for economic standing for nonuse damages is that people must
have knowledge of the specific injuries to the natural resources in their utility function.").
104. See Levy & Friedman, supra note 21, at 496.
105. Seeid. at514.
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psychological. 0 6 Due to this recognition and the generally strong sense
of psychological expectation on the part of the public, the use of both
WTP and WTA is appropriate, using a weighted average that accounts
for the degree of psychological expectation. In the case of Northwest
dam policy, a crucial question in determining the appropriate measure is
whether or not the public regards salmon and river restoration as an
environmental gain or as loss restored. To the extent the public has
always felt ownership, the weight of the willingness to accept (WTA)
should reflect the loss restored. The magnitude of existence value will
also be influenced by the divergence between the WTP and WTA due to
the public sense of value of the salmon and the river (the income effect),
and by the uniqueness of these resources (substitution possibilities).0 7
Existence values reflect real values that merit consideration. In
addition to the appropriate application of willingness to pay and
willingness to accept values, the questions that surround existence value
are essentially questions of economic standing: how broadly to define the
public for which existence values are measured and how broad is the
class of goods for which existence values exist? These questions are
matters of law and economics so an appropriate rights-based benefit cost
analysis must address them.
106. Federal common law has recognized public ownership of natural resources. See id. at 515.
Current state and federal court decisions tend to support the notion of public ownership rights. See
id at 519. Further, under the common law concept of a public trust doctrine, the government is
deemed to hold title to natural resources in trust for its citizens. This doctrine has the potential to
create enforceable legal rights for private citizens to enforce the public's interest in natural
resources. See Frona M. Powell, The Public Trust Doctrine: Implications for Property Owners and
the Environment, 25 Real Est. L.J. 255, 257-58 (1997). Exceptions to the common law recognition
of public ownership of natural resources do exist, however, as illustrated by the legal use of"public"
resources for private grazing and mining purposes. See Levy & Friedman, supra note 21, at 521-22.
The Endangered Species Act, with its mandate for species protection and citizen suit provisions,
appears to suggest some recognition of existence value for the public and a sense of public
ownership of natural resources. Regulations related to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) originally required the public trustee to select the lesser
of either restoration costs or diminution of value of the resources at issue. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 960 1-
9675 (West Supp. 1998). New parallel regulations giving greater weight to restoration were,
however, adopted by both the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the National Oceanographic
Atmospheric Administration in response to judicial decisions. See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dep't
of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 43 C.F.R § 11.83 (1998). The DOI also appears now
to acknowledge the appropriateness of WTA as the measure of public ownership of natural
resources. See Levy & Friedman, supra note 21, at 514-15.
107. See discussion supra Part ll.C.
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J Summary ofApplication of the Proposed Methodology
The following chart summarizes the application of the proposed
methodology to a benefit cost analysis of the major interests impacted by
proposals to alter hydroelectric operations and facilities.
INTERESTS BENEFITS COSTS
Hydropower Use WTP based on commercial
Licensee value and limited legal rights
Electricity For commercial consumers, use
Consumers WTP based on commercial value;
for private consumers, use WTA for
significant price increases to
represent the loss
Commercial Use WTP based on commercial
Navigation value
Irrigators & Use WTP to reflect the commercial
Other Water value of the water;, use WTA to
Users reflect any loss of way of
life/psychological expectation
Commercial Use WTP to reflect net long-
Fishing term gain in commercial value
Tribal Fishing Use WTA to reflect net long-
term restoration of legal right
and psychological expectation;
use WTP for any commercial
value
Sport Fishing Use WTA to reflect restoration
and psychological expectation
of a way of life; Use WTP for
commercial value of associated
businesses
Recreation and Use WTP for commercial value Use WTP for commercial value of
Tourism of new business opportunities; lost business opportunities; for
for users of new recreational existing recreational users, WTA
opportunities, use WTA to should reflect psychological sense
reflect psychological of loss
expectation and restoration of a
previous loss
Existence Value Use WTP and consider
to the Public divergence between WTP and
WTA weighted by extent of
psychological expectation
(which should reflect the sense
of a loss restored and the impact
of substitution possibilities)
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K. Significant Impacts of the Proposed Methodology
Consideration of legal rights and psychological expectations has
significant impacts on the measurement of values in a benefit cost
analysis by requiring the application of the willingness to accept (WTA)
value for those with rights who suffer loss or experience losses restored.
In addition, legal rights and psychological expectations are important to
the economic standing issue of whose interests and goods are included in
the analysis, particularly the inclusion of tribal rights and existence
value. The treatment of these issues can dramatically affect the outcome
and reliability of the benefit cost analysis, as values may be miscal-
culated and relevant interests may be excluded from the analysis. In
general, an appropriate rights-based consideration of benefits and costs
will lead to an increase in the calculation of the net benefits of dam
modifications and other salmon restoration proposals.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT STUDIES IN LIGHT OF PROPOSED
METHODOLOGY
The analyses originally undertaken to evaluate the building of
hydroelectric projects on the Lower Snake River showed that the dams
did not pass a benefit cost test. As we have noted, these analyses were
performed without mention of rights, tribal or otherwise, fishing values,
existence values, or species or habitat values. 10 8 Had consideration been
given to any of these sources of value, the arguments for not building the
dams would have been all the stronger. But they have been built. Now, as
fish preservation and restoration have become important, consideration is
being given to breaching dams on the Lower Snake River and modifying
operations at other Snake and Columbia River dams.
At least ten studies, in various stages of completion, include elements
of benefit cost analysis of salmon recovery efforts on the Snake and
108. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Asami Miyata, Changes in Valuation of
the Environment in Benefit Cost Analysis: A Case of Four Lower Snake Dams (1999) (unpublished
M.P.A. thesis, Univ. of Wash.) (on file with authors) (citing Keith C. Peterson & Mary E. Reed,
Controversy, Conflict and Compromise: A History of the Lower Snake River Development (1995);
Mary E. Reed, A History of North Pacific Division, U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers (1991)). As noted
previously, the original analyses also failed to consider issues of uncertainty. According to Gary
Ellis of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the ongoing Lower Snake River Feasibility Study
includes a section on uncertainty. See Comments on a Draft of this Article by Gary Ellis, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (June 7, 1999) (on file with authors).
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Columbia Rivers.1" One cannot report either comprehensively or
definitively on these studies, as most are incomplete. But if past reports,
current studies, drafts of forthcoming studies, and the guidelines used by
the Army Corps of Engineers are any indication, legal rights and
psychological expectations and the distinction between valuing gains and
losses in terms of WTP and WTA will be largely ignored. In general, the
studies simply use the WTP as the measure of costs and benefits for all
interests and ignore key interests, particularly tribal rights and existence
value.
These issues are evident in one of the few completed reports,
Lansing's analysis of restoring the Lower Snake to a free-flowing
river."' He concludes that removal of the four Lower Snake River dams
is supported by his benefit cost analysis. The study fails to distinguish
between the use of WTP and WTA for any of the interests addressed. He
focuses only on costs and savings associated with power generation,
mitigation of impacts on salmon, navigation, and irrigation. In doing so,
he gives no consideration to rights. The study fails to address the effects
on tribes or recreation and does not consider the existence value of
salmon, a free-flowing river, or the like. On balance, an appropriate
rights-based consideration of benefits and costs, incorporating all
interests and the using WTA to recognize legal rights and psychological
expectations, would likely lead to an increase in the calculation of the net
benefits of dam removal, at least as calculated by Lansing."'
109. See Government Accounting Office, Potential Economic Costs of Further Protection for
Columbia River Salmon (1993); Joel R. Hamilton & Norman K. Whittlesey, Cost of Using Water
from the Snake River Basin to Augment Flows for Endangered Salmon, Paper Presented Before the
Reg'l Science Ass'n Meeting (Feb. 26, 1996); Harza Northwest, Inc., U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Salmon Decision Analysis: Lower Snake River Feasibility Study (1996); Daniel D.
Huppert & David L. Fluharty, Natl Marine Fisheries Serv., Economics of Snake River Salmon
Recovery (1996); Daniel D. Huppert et al., Northwest Power Planning Council, River Economics:
Evaluating Trade-Offs in the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program (1999); Philip S.
Lansing, Oregon Natural Resources Council Fund, Restoring the Lower Snake River: Saving Snake
River Salmon and Saving Money (1999); U.S. Dep't of Energy, Columbia River System Operating
Review Final Environmental Impact Statement (1995); Gardner M. Brown Jr. et al., Washington
State Dep't of Ecology, Estimated Economic Benefits of Regulations to Improve Washington State
Fisheries (1999) (unpublished, bn file with authors); Daniel D. Huppert, Snake River Salmon
Recovery: Quantifying the Costs, (Nov. 2, 1998) (unpublished, on file with authors); John Loomis,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Lower Snake River Juvenile Mitigations Feasibility Study (1999)
(unpublished, on file with authors).
110. See Lansing, supra note 110.
111. Concerns have been raised regarding other aspects of Lansing's analysis, a subject that is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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A notable exception to the tendency to ignore these critical issues
appears to be the Corps's ongoing Lower Snake River Feasibility Study.
In response to an early draft of this paper, Gary Ellis of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers indicates that the feasibility study now includes a
section on tribal circumstances and covers existence values in a portion
of the Recreation Study. While the analyses of these issues are not
specifically calculated as part of the benefits and costs, they are
discussed in an effort to provide information to decisiomakers.1 t 2 The
inclusion of these issues appears to indicate both the continued
development of more sophisticated benefit cost methodologies and
changes in environmental values.
A. Distinguishing Between WTP and WTA
The importance of choosing between the use of willingness to pay
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) as the measure for certain
interests is demonstrated in Loomis's draft work on recreational benefits.
Loomis notes:
The U.S. Water Resources Council (1983) which governs the
conduct of benefit cost analyses by federal agencies such as the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) requires that benefits to the
visitor be measured as the ... net willingness to pay
(WTP) .... The economics profession also recommends net WTP
as the conceptually correct measure of benefits for benefit cost
analysis."'
This last sentence is incorrect. Current literature on this subject is
voluminous and its conclusions are generally quite opposite of the above
statement that the WTP is in all cases the correct measure." 4 The main
support for the use of the WTP is limited to practical considerations-
namely that it is easier to calculate. While calculation of the WTA values
may pose practical difficulties, incorporation of these values where
appropriate is essential for accurate and comprehensive benefit cost
analysis. As noted previously, such calculations have been found to be as
112. See Comments on a Draft of this Article by Gary Ellis, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (June
7, 1999) (on file with authors).
113. U.S. Water Resources Council, Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for
Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies (1983). The conclusions of the U.S. Water
Resources Council rely on the work of Sassone & Schaeffer and Loomis & Walsh.
114. Loomis's citation is to an outdated textbook that has never been well regarded.
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much as nineteen times greater."5 Thus, the use of WTA in appropriate
circumstances to recognize the existence of legal rights or psychological
expectations generally leads to much higher calculations of project
benefits and costs and can significantly alter the results of the benefit
cost analysis." 6
B. Recognition of Tribal Rights
As in Lansing's analysis, few of the current studies address the issue
of tribal rights."7 From a rights perspective, tribal interests should
receive economic standing in recognition of their legal rights and
psychological expectations. As noted previously, treaties have been
interpreted as a reservation of legal right and the tribes have a strong
sense of psychological expectation to the existence and harvest of the
salmon. Using the WTA value to represent the tribes' legal rights,
psychological expectations, and the restoration of these rights and
expectations will result in significantly greater benefit calculations of
proposals to protect and restore salmon.
C. Accounting for Existence Values
As noted previously, important issues arise with existence values:"'
whose existence values should the analyst include, for which goods
should the analyst calculate existence values, and when should the
willingness to accept (WTA) be used rather than the willingness to pay
(WTP)? Determination of which individuals and goods to include in
measuring existence values and the appropriate use of WTA for
existence values will, in many cases, be determinative of the benefit cost
outcome. Resolution of these issues is critical, yet it has been
substantially neglected in the various reports. Two studies highlight the
challenges associated with measuring existence values and demonstrate
115. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
116. In response to an early draft of this paper, Loomis indicates the potential of revising his work
to take into account the appropriate use of WTP and WTA. See Comments on a Draft of this Article
by John Loomis (June 9, 1999) (on file with authors).
117. The Corps's ongoing Lower Snake River Feasibility Study includes a section on tribal
circumstances that includes tribal viewpoints regarding the various alternatives discussed in the
study. See Comments on a Draft of this Article by Gary Ellis, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (June
7, 1999) (on file with authors).
118. See discussion supra Part IILI. In addition, there exists the practical problem of accurate
measurement.
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the impact of including existence values and resolving these challenges
can have on the outcome of the analyses. Clearly there remain issues of
standing with respect to existence values: for whom are existence values
measured and what goods are considered to have existence value."9
Huppert estimates the existence value associated with dam removal on
the Lower Snake based on calculations for the Pacific Northwest,
speculating that the high value is unlikely to be greater than $204 million
per year. 20 Loomis, however, estimates existence value using values for
the Pacific Northwest and California, resulting initially in much higher
existence value estimates of approximately $1040 million per year.'
Loomis's study points to a second issue related to the inclusiveness of
existence value. Existence value is calculated for the predicted increase
in salmon as well as for returning the Lower Snake to a free-flowing
river, independent of any effect on salmon populations. 22 This demon-
strates how the inclusion of all potential classes of existence value is
likely to further impact the outcome of benefit cost analyses associated
with dam modifications.
Existence values also require consideration of the distinction between
the use of willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA).
As noted previously, if restoration of salmon and a free-flowing river are
properly regarded as the restoration of a loss in recognition of
psychological expectations of the public, then the WTA measure should
be used. The resulting values will likely be significantly higher than
those calculated using a WTP measurement.1
23
The importance of properly accounting for questions of economic
standing and correctly measuring existence value using willingness to
accept (WTA) can hardly be overestimated. How the issues are resolved
will have a significant impact on the results of any benefit cost analysis.
119. Any economic argument for dam removal or modification would be made much stronger by
the inclusion of existence values. The differences between Huppert's, Loomis's and McKean's
analyses are important and are issues of legal and economic standing. See discussion supra Part II.E.
120. See Daniel D. Huppert, Snake River Salmon Recovery: Quantifying the Costs I I (Nov. 12,
1998) (unpublished, on file with authors).
121. See Loomis, supra note 110. This figure has been revised by Loomis to $96 million per year.
The revision is based on the assumption that without dam removal, salmon numbers will remain
stable. If the assumption is made that salmon numbers will continue to decline without dam removal,
the revised estimated existence value is $732 million per year. See Comments on a Draft of this
Article by Gary Ellis, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (June 7, 1999) (on file with authors).
122. The study calculates $1040 million for salmon and $420 million for a free-flowing river.
123. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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The failure of studies to use the proposed rights-based methodology
means the benefit cost analyses will not provide an accurate and
comprehensive assessment of the true impacts of the proposed salmon
recovery efforts. The analyses will therefore fail to provide accurate and
useful information to decisionmakers as they assess the trade-offs of the
proposed actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Benefit cost analyses of proposed alterations to hydroelectric projects
as part of salmon protection efforts should address both legal rights and
psychological expectations in order to result in comprehensive and
accurate assessments from which to make informed decisions. Proper
consideration of rights affects the measurement of benefits and costs by
requiring the distinction between willingness to pay (WTP) and
willingness to accept (WTA) values. The generally higher values
associated with WTA measurements are warranted in cases where the
interests have either legal rights or psychological expectations. In
addition, consideration of rights alters the determination of whose
interests and what goods are to be included in the analysis. Proper
consideration of these issues has the potential to significantly affect the
outcome of the analysis and influence the decisionmaking process. In the
case of proposals to alter Northwest hydroelectric projects in an effort to
restore salmon, the net benefits of such efforts are likely to be
significantly higher under a proper rights-based analysis.
These issues are not trivial ones. Insofar as benefit cost analyses do
not address them, the analyses contribute less to the appropriate public
discussion required as the public and decisionmakers may not have
adequate information from which to assess the true trade-offs of
alternative actions.
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